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Abstract: Our objective is to test the influence of information asymmetry between 
potential buyers on the premium paid for an acquisition. We analyze mergers and 
acquisitions as English auctions with asymmetric information. The theory of dynamic 
auctions with private values predicts that more informed bidders should pay a lower 
price for an acquisition. We test that prediction with a sample of 1,026 acquisitions in the 
United States between 1990 and 2007. We hypothesize that blockholders of the target’s 
shares are better informed than other bidders because they possess privileged 
information on the target. Information asymmetry between participants is shown to 
influence the premium paid. Blockholders pay a much lower conditional premium than 
do other buyers (around 70% lower). Tests also show that the characteristics of the 
target, specifically the runup, sales growth and size, affect the premium. The size of the 
target relative to the buyer, the choice of a public takeover bid and the hostility of the bid 
are also influential. 
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English auction, test for over-identifying restriction (Sargan test), test for endogeneity 
(Durbin-Wu-Hausman test) 
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Résumé: Notre objectif est de tester l’influence de l’asymétrie d’information entre des 
acheteurs potentiels sur la prime payée au moment d’une acquisition. Nous analysons 
les fusions et acquisitions comme des enchères anglaises avec asymétrie d’information. 
La théorie des enchères dynamiques avec des valeurs privées prédit que les 
participants les mieux informés devraient payer un prix plus bas pour une acquisition. 
Nous testons cette prédiction avec un échantillon de 1 026 acquisitions aux États-Unis 
durant la période 1990-2007. Nous supposons que les détenteurs de blocs d’actions de 
la cible sont mieux informés que les autres participants parce qu’ils possèdent des 
informations privilégiées sur la cible. L’asymétrie d’information entre les participants 
influence la prime payée. Les détenteurs de blocs d’actions paient une prime 
conditionnelle beaucoup plus basse que les autres acheteurs (environ 70 % plus faible). 
Les résultats montrent aussi que des caractéristiques de la cible, spécifiquement son 
runup, sa croissance des ventes et sa taille, affectent la prime. La taille relative de la 
cible par rapport à celle de son acquéreur, le choix d’offre publique d’achat et le choix de 
proposition hostile ont aussi un pouvoir explicatif important de la prime. 
 
Mots clés: Information asymétrique, fusion et acquisition, bloc d’actions, prime, enchère 
anglaise, test de sur identification (Sargan), test d’endogénéité (Durbin-Wu-Hausman)  
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1. Introduction 
 
Mergers and acquisitions have prevailed in economies around the world for several decades. The 
scope of this phenomenon varies from year to year. Three main waves of acquisitions have been 
over the recent years, culminating in 1989, 1999 and 2007. The last wave that started in 2003 is 
characterized by the increasing presence of companies from emerging markets. 
 
Acquisitions are an interesting growth avenue for many companies. Potential economies of scale, 
vertical integration, synergies or tax savings propel organizations to opt for this form of growth. 
Companies often disburse exorbitant amounts to acquire a target. Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn 
(2008) find that the average premium paid for American acquisitions between 1980 and 2002 
equals 48% of the market value of the target before the initial bid, and some premiums even 
exceed 100%. The high prices disbursed do not always yield the anticipated outcome because 
some companies tend to overvalue the potential of the transaction. 
 
The recent literature that has attempted to identify the determinants of the premium paid during 
an acquisition has concentrated on the characteristics of the target, the buyer and the transaction. 
These studies find that the premium paid is influenced in particular by the size of the company, 
the debt level, the hostility of the transaction and the payment mode. However, consensus has 
rarely been reached concerning the various factors examined.  
 
Fishman (1988) proposes that the acquisition process is highly similar to an auction in an 
asymmetrical information environment. Two previous empirical studies of auctions demonstrate 
the significant impact of information asymmetry on the price the winner pays. Hendricks and 
Porter (1988) conclude that information asymmetry between the participants in auctions on 
drainage tracts for oil and gaz decreases the price paid by the winner when the player’s valuation 
is limited to the common value of the good. Conversely, Dionne, St-Amour and Vencatachellum 
(2009) contend that information asymmetry drives an increase in the price paid by the winning 
bidder of a slave auction when the valuation includes a common component and a private 
component. Thus, information asymmetry should have a real impact on the auction bids and 
should influence the premium paid during a transaction. 
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The objective of this article is to empirically test the influence of several determinants of the 
premium identified in the literature on mergers and acquisitions by looking closely at a 
previously unexplored factor: information asymmetry between potential buyers. The theoretical 
literature related to acquisitions underlines the importance of examining whether such asymmetry 
influences the premium paid (Dasgupta and Tsui, 2004; Ravid and Spiegel, 1999; Fishman, 
1988). The empirical literature emphasizes the role of toeholds (acquisition of target shares) in 
generating information (Betton et al., 2000, 2009). We do not follow this line of research because 
toeholds do not necessary possess more information than the market on targets. Instead, we 
analyze the role of blockholders1 of the target’s shares. As documented in the recent literature, 
the monitoring activities of blockholders give them preferred access to managers and board 
members, and hence a distinct information advantage to evaluate the performance and fair value 
of the target (Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Brockman and Yan, 2009; Kang and Kim, 2008; Edmans, 
2009). 
 
Kang and Kim (2008) show that block acquirers prefer geographically proximate targets: 
observed ratio of firms acquired by blocks located in the same state is 20%, whereas only 7% of 
all U.S. public firms are acquired by a buyer residing in the same state. Another interesting result 
in this study for our purpose is that geographic proximity is an important factor to explain 
incentives to perform an active governance role in targets and to develop information asymmetry, 
which corroborates Brockman and Yan (2009), Chen et al. (2007), and Edmans (2009). Edmans 
(2009) also documents that blockholders encourage managers to take actions that increase long-
run value or to undertake investments that increase fundamental value. Our research question is: 
How do these better informed bidders influence the premium paid in mergers and acquisitions? 
 
We also differ from the empirical literature on mergers and acquisitions by using auction theory 
to derive the pricing implication from the presence of informed bidders. Our main contribution is 
to test for the presence of asymmetric information by extending recent empirical methodologies 
developed for other types of auctions. We instrument the blockholders variable because its 
                                                 
1 A block of shares is a proportion of the shares that represents at least 5%. Buyers with a proportion of shares of less 
than 5% are less likely to possess privileged information. 
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presence in the bid could be endogenously determined. We use more than one instrument for the 
presence of blockholders in the auction so we can test whether the instruments are truly 
exogenous and confirm the relevance of instrumental variables in explaining the presence of 
blockholders. These instrumental variables are presented in Section 5. 
 
An additional contribution of our research is the sample that we have formed. It comprises 1026 
takeover transactions in the United States between 1990 and 2007. Notably, the sample is recent 
and we have compiled accounting data on the target and the buyer, data related to the acquisition 
process and data concerning changes in the share price of the two parties to the transaction. This 
sample allows us to include several explanatory variables related to the premium paid in our 
econometric model, which contributes to the richness of our results.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the influence of information asymmetry in 
the auction context. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Empirical implications of the theory 
are also discussed. Section 4 contains the review of the empirical literature on the determinants of 
the premium. Section 5 specifies the econometric models used, along with the database and 
descriptive statistics for the variables. Section 6 presents and analyzes the results, and the 
robustness tests are found in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Acquisitions and information asymmetry 
2.1. Acquisition perceived as an auction 
 
Several authors agree that the acquisition process is quite similar to that of the Japanese version 
of an English auction (Fishman, 1988; Ravid and Spiegel, 1999). Other authors model the 
acquisition as a sealed-bid second-price auction. Notably, Burkart (1995) and Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) endorse this view of the acquisition because such auctions are quite 
malleable and easier to analyze than the English auction.  
 
Even though acquisitions do not always involve several potential buyers, researchers still 
characterize them as auctions. One possible explanation for this was proposed by Fishman 
(1988), who models the acquisition as costly in an asymmetrical information environment. He 
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asserts that acquisitions including a single participant can be considered auctions in which the 
other interested participants are not manifested.  
 
2.2. Information asymmetry in sealed-bid auctions 
 
The theoretical literature on sealed-bid auctions with information asymmetry began with Wilson 
(1967). He analyzed the sealed-bid auction with information asymmetry when the good is valued 
uniquely according to its common value (absence of private value). The common value includes 
the elements that are pertinent for all participants that appraise the good at auction. Thus, in terms 
of common value, the players weigh the same elements (such as productivity or profits) but may 
value the object differently. Information asymmetry exists because one participant holds more 
precise private information on the value of the good. Wilson (1967) showed that the more 
informed party has a much higher marginal expected return than the uninformed competitors. 
 
Weverberght (1979), Milgrom and Weber (1982), and Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and 
Weber (1983) revisit the problem and propose a different version of the equilibrium premium. 
They predict that the informed participant’s anticipated profit is generally positive, whereas the 
expected profits of the other players are zero. The fear of the winner’s curse (winning by bidding 
a too high price) prevails among uninformed players. Informed participants can then win the 
auction at a lower price. 
 
Hendricks and Porter (1988) test this main prediction of the theoretical literature on sealed bid 
auctions with common value in a context of information asymmetry. Their analysis of auctions of 
drainage tracts for oil and gas between 1959 and 1969 indicates that companies adjacent to the 
tract being sold hold superior information because of the exploration they do on their own land. 
They are therefore better informed than the other firms. The empirical results strongly support the 
prediction of the theoretical model. The returns of more informed firms are positive while those 
of less informed firms are negligible. 
 
 6 
 
2.3. Information asymmetry in English auctions 
 
The influence of information asymmetry in English auctions has also intrigued researchers. 
Hernando-Veciana and Tröge (2004) analyze an English auction with information asymmetry and 
distinguish common value from private value. They study the uninformed participants’ behavior 
during the auction when the party that holds privileged information is present. They conclude that 
the uninformed bidder’s strategies are mainly dictated by the interaction between the winner’s 
curse and the loser’s curse (losing by bidding too low). The uninformed participant may deduce 
that the informed player remains active because the common value is high. Thus, the former 
remains at the auction to avoid the loser’s curse. Conversely, the uninformed participant may 
believe that the informed bidder remains in the auction because he has high private value. In this 
case, the uninformed bidder leaves to avoid the winner’s curse. The authors argue that the 
probability of loser’s curse is markedly higher than the probability of winner’s curse among 
uninformed participants that have high private value. Uninformed bidders protect themselves 
from the loser’s curse by submitting aggressive offers when an informed competitor is present. 
Informed players must then bid a large amount to discourage the other participants and win the 
auction. 
 
Dionne, St-Amour and Vencatachellum (2008) extend the empirical model developed by Hong 
and Shum (2003) and derive the empirical implications of the presence of an informed participant 
in an English auction with private and common value. In their model, the informed player makes 
an overall valuation because the common value cannot be distinguished from the private value. 
Dionne, St-Amour and Vencatachellum (2008) conclude that the presence of an informed 
participant prompts more aggressive offers by uninformed players. They also confirm the 
competition-dampening impact of informed bidding (Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al., 1983) in a 
special case of their model where private values are on average zero. They conclude that private 
valuation contributes significantly to the enhancing effect of the winning bid. 
 
Dionne, St-Amour and Vencatachellum (2008) test their theoretical predictions on a sample of 
slave auctions in Mauritius between 1825 and 1834. They hypothesize that a familial relationship 
between the buyer and seller grants the buyer privileged information about the slave. Their results 
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are consistent with the auction model when private valuations are taken into account because the 
equilibrium price is higher when the informed player wins the auction.  
 
To summarize, in the pure common value context (in either English or sealed-bid auctions), the 
presence of information asymmetry between the participants lowers the price paid by the 
informed player if that player wins the auction, because of the winner’s curse. Inversely, in 
English auctions with common and private value, information asymmetry may raise the price 
paid by the informed player if that player wins the auction, when the loser’s curse prevails. The 
presence of private value along with asymmetric information therefore seems to influence the 
results considerably. In the following sections, we adopt the English auction interpretation of the 
acquisitions process. 
 
2.4. Privileged information of blockholders 
 
Information asymmetry between the bidders at an auction seems to influence the price paid by the 
winner considerably. If the target object at an auction is a complex good such as a company, the 
participants probably use disparate information to evaluate the target, which will affect the 
premium paid by the buyer. Several recent studies show that information asymmetry is 
manifested in a company when its ownership structure includes blockholders and diffused 
shareholders (Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Brockman and Yan, 2009; Kang and Kim, 2008; Edmans, 
2009). These shareholders have an advantage when appraising the performance and the fair value 
of the target. 
 
3. Theoretical model 
 
The theoretical model that corresponds to our empirical analysis is a particular case of the model 
proposed by Dionne et al. (2009). We consider an open-bid, single-good, ascending auction with 
common value and potential private value. As in Wilson (1998), we restrict the auction model to 
the Japanese version of the English ascending auction where the dropping-out decision is public 
and irrevocable. Some bidders may have private preferences regarding some targets but we 
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assume that, on average, these preferences are not significant for mergers and acquisitions. One 
important assumption is related to the presence of asymmetric information across bidders. 
 
Let us assume that the stochastic process is log normal. The total valuation of a target firm by 
bidder i, Vi, can be written as  log i iV v  as well its log signal,  log i iX x . We assume that: 
 i iv a v   (1) 
 i i ix v    (2) 
where: 
     2 2 2, , N.I.D. 0, ,0 ,Diag , , .i i i o ia v m t r s     (3) 
 
The total valuation of a target by agent i is the sum of private value ai and common value v; its 
signal xi is a random variable. All random variables are assumed i.i.d. Gaussian with  2 2i ot r  the 
variance of the private (common) value and 2is  the variance of the signal. All distribution 
parameters are common knowledge. One bidder  I  has more information than other bidders. 
This bidder can be identified by all other bidders and asymmetric information is introduced by 
assuming a more precise signal for bidder : 0iI s   for i I  and 0is   for all other bidders. 
 
Our model differs from the pure common-value model  0,i ia    of Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 
(1983) and Hendricks and Porter (1988) by allowing some agents to have private valuations of 
the target. This additional flexibility does not affect the empirical prediction that the more 
informed agent should pay a lower price when he wins the auction but allows the possibility that 
some agents may have private valuation. It also supports a more general empirical model. If one 
observes empirically that more informed agents pay a positive premium, this would mean that 
private values are important in this market and that ia  is positive in line with the model of 
Dionne et al. (2009) and contrary to the above assumption that  0ia  . 
 
Hong and Shum (2003) derived the equilibrium bid of agent i at round k under the log-normal 
assumption: 
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  1k k k ki i i d ik
i
b x D x C
A
    (4) 
where kiA , 
k
iD  and 
k
iC  are functions of the distributional parameters ti, m, ro, si and 
k
dx  is the 
observable vector of signals from exited bidders at round k. Dionne et al. (2009) designed a 
Monte-Carlo experiment to compute the private information premium of agent i, at round k and 
Monte-Carlo experiment j: 
      , , ,1 ,0k ki ii k j b j b j    (5) 
where  ,1kib j  is computed when an informed bidder is present in the auction and  ,0kib j  is 
computed without an informed bidder. One can verify that the informed agent never lets 
uninformed agents win at a price lower than the common value when the private value is not 
important  0ia  . Consequently, the premium for the informed agent is non-positive. 
 
As mentioned above, the theory predicts that the direction of the influence of information 
asymmetry on the premium depends on the inclusion of a private value component in the 
valuation of the target. Below we will test whether information asymmetry significantly 
influences the premium. We will then analyze the direction of this impact to determine the type 
of valuation the buyers perform. We anticipate a significant negative influence on the premium if 
no significant private value is attributed to the target. 
 
4. Empirical literature on mergers and acquisitions 
4.1. Premium 
 
We study takeovers in general, which include acquisitions in which the buyer holds the majority 
of the shares of the target after the transaction. We are interested in the final price the buyer pays 
to take control of the target. The price paid notably reflects the potential of the target and the 
negotiating power of the parties to the transaction. 
 
The premium is the measure of the auction outcome. Gondhalekar, Sant and Ferris (2004) 
analyze the premiums paid by buyers during a period that covers three decades, mainly 1973 to 
1999. The authors define the premium as the difference in percentage between the final price and 
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the share price of the target 40 days before the announcement of the offer. They estimate the 
average premium for their entire sample at 53%. However, the premium varies considerably, 
ranging from a maximum of 103% in 1976 to a minimum of 22% in 1991.  
 
Given that the runup (see the definition below) in the share price of the target is manifested 
mainly after the 42nd day before the announcement (Schwert, 1996), we use the price on this date 
as the reference price to set the premium because it reflects the value the shareholders attribute to 
the company before the rumors. We therefore define the premium as follows: 
42-ln  ( Final  price / Price )  where -42Price  represents the share price of the target, adjusted for 
splits and dividends, on the 42nd day before the announcement. This definition was also used by 
Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008). 
 
4.2. Determinants of the premium 
 
Several studies have sought to identify the factors that influence the price paid in a takeover 
transaction. Knowledge of these factors is crucial because it allows the parties to the transaction 
to set the fairest price possible. The determinants analyzed in the literature are mainly related to 
the characteristics of the target, the buyer and the transaction.  
 
Runup 
 
To measure the runup effect, Schwert (1996) estimates the runup as the cumulative abnormal 
return on the target's stock over a two-month period before the announcement. The lowest 
estimate implies that at least 67% of the run-up is added to the total price paid to acquire the 
target. Thus, a higher runup is associated with a higher premium paid to acquire a target. Betton, 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2009b) also examine the impact of the runup on the premium paid during 
an acquisition. They model the runup as the logarithm of the ratio of the share price of the target 
on the day before the announcement to the share price 42 days before the announcement. They 
conclude that the higher the runup, the higher the premium paid to acquire the target. An increase 
of $1.00 of runup creates an average premium increase of $0.80. 
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Like Schwert (1996), we use the cumulative abnormal return over a two-month period before the 
announcement to reflect the runup in the share price of the target. First we estimate, for each 
target, a model that links the return of the target ( itR ) to the return of the S&P 500 index ( mtR ), 
for a period ranging from the 379th day before the announcement until the 64th day before the 
announcement: it i i mt itR R      where t = -379 to -64. Using the estimated alpha and beta 
coefficients, we compute the error term of the market model for each target, for each day of the 
two-month period before the announcement. The error term corresponds to the abnormal return: 
ˆˆit it i i mtR R      where t = -42 à -1. The runup, i.e. the cumulative abnormal return, is 
computed by summing the error terms:
1
42
i it
t
Runup 

  . We posit that the premium a buyer pays 
increases with the runup of the share price of the target, which is consistent with the markup price 
effect identified by Schwert (1996). 
 
Market-to-book ratio of the target 
 
The market-to-book ratio is used in the literature to represent new growth opportunities for 
companies. Thus, buyers pay more for a target with a high market-to-book ratio because it offers 
new investment opportunities. Gondhalekar, Sant and Ferris (2004) test this hypothesis but do not 
obtain significant results. Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) assert that if the market-to-book 
ratio of the target is higher than the median ratio of the industry, the target is a growth company 
relative to its competitors and should therefore command a higher premium. They find that a 
market-to-book ratio higher than the industry median is associated with a 3% increase in the 
premium. Comment and Schwert (1995) obtain a lower premium because some bidders may be 
attracted by firms that are underevaluated by the market. 
 
We include the market-to-book ratio of the target in our analysis. We define market value as the 
product of the share price and the number of common shares outstanding. The book value of the 
company corresponds to the book value of common equity. We calculate this ratio at the end of 
the most recent fiscal year before the announcement of the transaction. The impact of this ratio on 
the premium is ambiguous. A negative relation should be anticipated between the market-to-book 
ratio and the premium if a low ratio illustrates the undervaluation of the target, whereas a positive 
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relation between the market-to-book ratio and the premium should be seen if a low ratio signals 
restricted investment opportunities. 
 
Sales growth of the target 
 
The past performance of the target may have two opposite effects on the premium. First, buyers 
may be interested in targets that perform poorly because of the gains that could be realized if the 
current managers were replaced. In this case, the relation between the performance of the target 
and the premium is negative. Schwert (2000) analyzes the influence of past performance on the 
premium paid and obtains a negative but nonsignificant coefficient. Second, poor performance is 
often associated with fragile financial health, and is therefore likely to hinder the target’s ability 
to negotiate. The relation between performance and the premium is thus positive. Like Bange and 
Mazzeo (2004), we measure past performance by sales growth during the fiscal year before the 
announcement of the offer, defined as: 
 1 1t t- t-Total sales  - Total sales Total sales  
where t represents the most recent fiscal year before the announcement. This choice is based on 
the empirical evidence provided in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994, p. 1550), who 
measured past growth by growth in sales because sales is a less volatile variable than either cash 
flow or earnings. 
 
Company size 
 
The literature identifies two main variables that have been used to analyze the influence of 
company size on the premium paid. Some authors consider the size of the target directly, whereas 
others opt for a ratio of the size of the target to that of the buyer. Schwert (2000) and Comment 
and Schwert (1995), among others, use a direct measure of the target size and conclude that this 
variable has a significant negative effect on the premium because larger targets are associated 
with higher integration costs. Gondhalekar, Sant and Ferris (2004) and Moeller (2005) study a 
relative size variable and report an adverse effect of target size on the premium. 
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Consistent with Comment and Schwert (1995), we measure the target size as the logarithm of the 
total assets, and employ this variable at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the bid. We 
also use a ratio of the size of the target to that of the buyer. Specifically, the relative size is 
calculated by comparing the market value of the shares of the target to the market value of the 
buyer’s stock. The market values are obtained at the start of the runup period, namely two months 
before the announcement. We assume that the size variables are negatively linked to the 
premiums paid by the buyer.  
 
Financial synergies  
 
The debt level of the parties to the transactions illustrates their financial health. Gondhalekar, 
Sant and Ferris (2004) propose that the buyer’s leverage can influence the premium paid. 
Considerable leverage will probably be associated with closer monitoring of the company’s 
operations by creditors. Creditors will, in turn, try to prevent the buyer from paying an overly 
high premium. They identify a significant negative influence of the buyer’s debt ratio on the 
premium paid. A target that has considerable debt is less attractive, and the premium paid to 
obtain it is putatively lower. We therefore predict a negative influence of the two parties’ debt 
ratio on the premium paid. We estimate the debt level, for each of the parties to the transaction, as 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the 
announcement of the acquisition. 
 
Governance of the buyer 
 
The price paid during an acquisition can also be dictated by the buyer’s hubris or agency 
problems. The hubris hypothesis, introduced by Roll (1986), stipulates that managers that possess 
exaggerated self confidence overestimate their ability to manage the target, which leads them to 
pay considerable amounts to acquire it. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) examine the influence of 
hubris of the CEO on the premium paid during large acquisitions. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) 
confirm that hubris is associated with a higher premiums paid. 
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We use the return on the buyer’s stock for a six-month period before the runup period, namely 
the return adjusted for splitting and dividends between the eighth and second month before the 
announcement. We thus posit that the recent performance of the organization, which leads 
managers to overestimate their ability to manage the target, is positively associated with the 
premium paid. 
 
Agency problems can also influence the acquisition process. Such conflicts occur when the 
buyer’s managers use the company’s free cash flows to undertake projects that generate few 
profits for shareholders, consistent with Jensen (1986). Gondhalekar, Sant and Ferris (2004) 
argue that one implication of agency problems is that buyers characterized by a low market-to-
book ratio but large free cash flows will favor more aggressive acquisition approaches and 
therefore pay higher premiums. They analyze the impact of free cash flows and investment 
opportunities on the premium individually using linear regressions, and conclude that large cash 
flows positively influence the premium, which supports the idea that managers decisions’ 
occasionally serve to maximize their own interests. Further, the buyer’s investment opportunities 
are inversely related to the premium paid. 
 
To analyze the impact of governance problems, we include the buyer’s free cash flows. Managers 
can use these cash flows to purchase a company at a high price, to serve their own interests. We 
expect a positive relation between the premium paid and the ratio of free cash flows to total 
assets. This ratio is obtained for the fiscal year immediately preceding the transaction. Free cash 
flows are estimated as the operational income before depreciation, less total income taxes, 
changes in taxes and deferred investment credits, interest expenses and dividends on preferred 
and common stock. 
 
Company managers that possess considerable free cash flows are more likely to pay a higher 
premium if investment opportunities are limited. Consequently, we include the market-to-book 
ratio of the buyer’s assets at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the bid to control for 
growth opportunities. The numerator represents the market value of the assets, which is 
calculated as the book value of the assets, from which we subtract the book value of the equity 
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and add the market value of the equity. The denominator is defined as the book value of the 
assets. We predict a negative influence of the buyer’s market-to-book ratio on the premium.  
 
Hostility 
 
A target that receives a takeover bid can either accept the transaction or reject it aggressively. 
Schwert (2000) maintains that a hostile reaction is intended to prevent the acquisition or initiate 
negotiation of a better offer. Accordingly, hostility is a negotiation strategy intended to increase 
the price the buyer pays. He also affirms that the hostile reaction is intended to decrease the 
probability of success of the transaction. Nonetheless, the author concludes that a manifestation 
of hostility seems to be mainly linked to strategic negotiation. Using the definition of hostility 
proposed by SDC Platinum, Moeller (2005) finds that hostile transactions command a higher 
premium. 
 
We use one of the five definitions put forth by Schwert (2000) to characterize the hostility of the 
transaction. We create an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when the transaction is 
defined as hostile according to SDC Platinum. This database defines a hostile transaction as an 
unsolicited offer that the board of directors of the targets rejects. We anticipate a positive relation 
between hostility and the premium in line with Schwert’s (2000) assertion that hostility is a 
negotiation strategy intended to increase the price paid by the buyer. 
 
Buyer’s strategies 
 
Potential buyers may choose to either negotiate with the managers of the target or to make a 
tender offer to shareholders. Public takeover bids do not require approval by the board of the 
target and are therefore quicker. Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) identify a 6.1% drop in 
premium if potential buyers decide to make a public takeover offer rather than negotiate with 
managers. Moeller (2005) also reports that a public purchase offer has a negative impact on the 
premium, whereas Comment and Schwert (1995), Schwert (2000) and Bange and Mazzeo (2004) 
obtain a positive influence for a public offer. We use an indicator variable with a value of one for 
a public takeover offer and do not predict a net effect. 
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Potential buyers also choose the payment method. Slusky and Caves (1991), Comment and 
Schwert (1995, 2000) and Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) conclude that a wholly cash 
payment, which implies a prominent tax effect, increases the premium significantly. We control 
for the process by creating an indicator variable that equals 1 if the transaction is fully paid in 
cash. The influence of this variable on the premium paid is assumed to be positive. 
 
The presence of more than one potential buyer creates competition that could increase the 
premium that the target could obtain from the buyer. We consequently include an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if a third party has submitted an offer for the target while the first buyer’s 
offer is still pending. We predict a positive relation between the presence of several buyers and 
the premium. 
 
Information asymmetry 
 
The Blockholders variable is used to measure the effect of information asymmetry. We therefore 
capture the information asymmetry between bidders by identifying the buyer that holds a block of 
the target’s shares before making the offer. The purchase of a block of shares is public 
information because it requires buyers to complete a report with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) describing their intentions. The public nature of our information asymmetry 
variable is crucial because we assume, as in an English auction, that the informed participant’s 
identity is known by all the players. We thus predict a significant relation between the premium 
and blockholders. 
 
The Blockholders variable is equal to 1 if the buyer holds a block (more than 5%) of the target’s 
shares before making the offer. If this variable is significant, our result corroborates the theory 
that information asymmetry between potential buyers plays an important role in determining the 
premium. By analyzing the sign of this significant coefficient, we can deduce whether the buyers 
include a private component in their valuation of the target. A negative sign would imply an 
absence of private value. We also instrument the Blockholders variable as discussed in the next 
section. Table 1 summarizes the above discussion. 
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Table 1: Description of independent variables 
This table presents the independent variables of our study, the hypotheses about their influence 
on the premium paid and the method used to construct the variables. All accounting ratios were 
estimated from data gathered at the end of the most recent fiscal year before the announcement of 
the offer. Data sources are also indicated. 
Independent variable Predicted sign Construction method and data source 
1) Target 
Runup + Cumulative abnormal return on the period 
ranging from the 42nd day before the 
announcement to the last day before the 
announcement. Source: CRSP 
Market-to-book Uncertain Number of common shares outstanding 
(Compustat #25) × Share price (Compustat 
#24)/Book value of equity (Compustat #60). 
Sales growth Uncertain Total sales (Compustat #12) at time t – Total 
sales at time t – 1/Total sales at time t – 1 
where t represents the end of the most recent 
fiscal year before the announcement of the 
transaction 
Size – Logarithm (Total assets (Compustat #6)) 
Leverage – Long-term debt (Compustat #9)/Total assets 
(Compustat #6) 
2) Buyer 
Return on stock + (Buyer’s share price 42 business days before 
the offer – Buyer’s share price 168 business 
days before the offer)/Buyer’s share price 168 
business days before the offer. Source: CRPS 
Free cash flows + Operating income before depreciation 
(Compustat #13) – Total income taxes (CST 
#16) – Change in tax credits and deferred 
investments (CST #35) – Interest expenses 
(CST #15) – Preferred dividends (CST #19) – 
Common dividends (CST #21)/Total assets 
(CST #6) 
Market-to-book – Total assets (Compustat #6) – Book value of 
equity (CST #60) – Number of common shares 
outstanding (CST #25) × Share price (CST 
#24)/Total assets (Compustat #6) 
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Independent variable Predicted sign Construction method and data source 
Relative size – (Target: Number of common shares 
outstanding (CST #25) × Share price 42 days 
before the announcement (CRSP))/ Buyer: 
Number of common shares outstanding (CST 
#25) × Share price 42 days before the 
announcement (CRSP)) 
Leverage – Long-term debt (Compustat #9)/Total assets 
(Compustat #6) 
3) Transaction 
Public purchase offer Uncertain Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the transaction is in the form of a public 
purchase offer 
Cash payment + Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the transaction is fully paid in cash 
Hostility + Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
SDC Platinum describes the offer as hostile. 
Multiple players + Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
third party has submitted an offer for the target 
whereas the first buyer’s offer is still pending 
4) Information asymmetry 
Blockholders 
No private value 
Non-zero 
– 
Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the buyer owns at least 5% of the shares of the 
target before the announcement. Note that this 
variable is also instrumented. 
5) Instrumental variables discussed in Section 5 
Intrastate  + Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the target and the blockholders are from the 
same state (Compustat). 
Regulated industry + Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the target is regulated (SIC code begins with 4 
or 6). 
Intrastate*performance – Variable equal to the product of targets’ 
performance and a dummy variable indicating 
that the target and the blockholders are from 
the same state. Performance of the target is 
measured by Operating income before 
depreciation (Compustat #13)/Total assets 
(Compustat #6). 
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5. Methodology 
 
In this section we specify the econometric models used in the study. We describe our sample in 
detail and present descriptive statistics of the premium and the independent variables of our 
model. 
 
5.1. Econometric models 
 
We estimate the influence of determinants of the premium identified in the previous section using 
the ordinary least squares method. Our model is expressed as follows:  
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
 = +  +  + i i i i
i i i
i i i i
Premium Runup TMarket-to-book β TSales growth  +
β TSize  + β TLeverage  +β BReturn on Stock  + β BFree cash 
flows + β BMarket-to-book  + β BRelative size  + β BLeverage  +β Public 
Off
  
12 13 14 15i i i i i ier  +β Cash payment  + β Hostility  + β Multiple players  +β Blockholders  + μ
 (6)  
where T is for target and B is for the winning bidder. 
 
The test for the null hypothesis of no information asymmetry is 15 0.  The variable of interest 
to test for the presence of information asymmetry may be correlated with the unobservable 
factors in (6), and ordinary least square estimates may be biased. Blockholders may submit bids 
because they want to be more active in a particular industry and the current offer by a competitor 
may reduce this opportunity. One way to reduce potential bias is to instrument the Blockholders 
variable by adding exogenous variables to the vector of explanatory variables and by using the 
2SLS method of estimation for the two equations. We choose to use a linear regression for the 
first stage because the first-stage functional form does not affect the consistency of the second-
stage estimates (Angrist and Kuerger, 2001). We also estimate the logit regression for robustness 
analysis. 
 
The additional explanatory variables must be correlated with Blockholdersi and not correlated 
with the error term in (6). They must explain the probability that blockholders win the auction 
and should not influence the premium directly. 
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We use three variables to instrument the presence of blockholders in the target: 1) Intrastate; 
2) Regulated industry; 3) An interaction variable between Intrastate and performance of the 
target. The first variable comes from the contribution of Kang and Kim (2009). They document 
that blockholders prefer targets in the same state because proximity reduces the transaction costs 
of activities yielding higher returns. They also show that the monitoring of intrastate firms is 
more valuable for targets that have greater asymmetric information such as targets with poor past 
performance. Blockholders are consequently more likely to buy shares in intrastate 
underperforming firms to better exploit their informational advantage. We assume that 
blockholders are more present in poorly performing targets of their state because they have a 
higher probability of obtaining long-run value by exploiting asymmetric information with other 
competitors. The other variable controls for the fact that the industry of the target is regulated. 
Blockholders should better exploit their informational advantage for these firms because they are 
more knowledgeable about the different laws regulating the target. As pointed out above, these 
three variables must be correlated with the probability that blockholders win the auction but 
should neither directly affect the premium nor be correlated with the residuals of the premium 
equation. Because three instruments are examined, we can apply two formal tests to verify the 
desired result: the Sargan test for the over-identifying restrictions (the instruments are truly 
exogenous) and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for the relevance of instrumental variables method 
(or the endogeneity test). We test that Intrastate, Regulated industry, and Intrastate* performance 
are relevant instruments in the Blockholders equation. 
 
We perform two additional analyses to confirm the validity of the result attributable to the 
information asymmetry variable. First, we reproduce the test by Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse 
(2001).2 These authors show that a significant influence of information asymmetry can be 
obtained in (6) because of the poor specification of the model or the presence of nonlinearity. It is 
possible to avoid these problems by adding the predicted probability of a potential buyer’s being 
informed as an independent variable in the initial econometric model. We therefore test the 
following model: 
                                                 
2 Other recent empirical tests include Chiappori et al. (2006); Cohen (2005); de Meza and Webb (2001); Fang et al. 
(2008); Finkelstein and McGarry (2006); Finkelstein and Poterba (2006); Hendel and Lizzeri (2003). See Cohen and 
Siegelman (2010) for a recent survey. 
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 0 15 16 ( )i j i i i i iPremium  =   X   Blockholders   E Blockholders Z            (7) 
where Xi represents the independent variables that predict the premium in our initial model, 
excluding the iBlockholders  variable, and iZ  represents the independent variables used to predict 
the probability that a buyer holds at least 5% of the target’s shares before the announcement of 
the offer (not instrumented). We used the Logit model to estimate the probability that a player is 
a blockholder. Again, 15 0  tests for the absence of information asymmetry. 
 
We further validate the influence of information asymmetry using the non-parametric test 
proposed by Chiappori and Salanié (2000). Specifically, we estimate the logit equation 
mentioned above along with (6), excluding the Blockholders variable. If the premium paid is 
influenced by information asymmetry between the participants, we should observe a significant 
correlation between the residuals of the two regressions and a negative correlation in absence of 
private value. 
 
5.2. Sample 
5.2.1. Sample formation 
 
The sample was derived from three databases. First we identified takeover transactions through 
the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database. We targeted successful transactions that 
occurred between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2007, involving American public targets 
and buyers. We included only transactions in the form of mergers, acquisitions of a majority 
interest, acquisitions of total assets or acquisitions of particular assets.3 Further, we chose only 
transactions intended to take control of the company and therefore we require that the buyer hold 
less than 50% of the shares of the target before the acquisition. We initially observed 5,984 
takeovers. Given that we are investigating the premium and its determinants, it is crucial to know 
the price that the buyer paid to take control of the target. After eliminating transactions for which 
this information was not available, we obtained a sample of 4,879 takeovers. 
 
                                                 
3 We exclude transactions categorized as exchange offers, buybacks, recapitalizations, acquisitions (by the 
shareholders), acquisitions of remaining interest and acquisitions of partial interest. 
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We also eliminated transactions for which information about the transaction was not available in 
SDC Platinum. Accordingly, 478 observations were removed from the sample because they did 
not provide information on the indicator variables of public purchase offers, cash payments, 
hostility and multiple players. We then gathered accounting data concerning the targets and 
buyers using Compustat to test several hypotheses concerning determinants of the premium. Most 
accounting information pertained to the end of the most recent fiscal year before the 
announcement. However, we compiled data concerning sales, tax and deferred investment credits 
for the year before the most recent fiscal year before the announcement to test our hypotheses 
concerning growth of the target’s sales and the free cash flows of the buyer. Transactions for 
which accounting data were not available in the periods desired (2990) were eliminated. 
 
Lastly, we obtain the sequence of share prices of the target and the buyer from the database of the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). These prices were used to calculate the premium, 
the recent return on the buyer’s stock and the runup of the target. We eliminated transactions for 
which information related to share prices of the parties involved was not available (385). We 
obtained a final sample of 1,026 takeover transactions for which all the data required to construct 
the variables of our model are available. 
 
5.2.2. Description of the sample 
 
Figure 1 presents the number of transactions and the average premium for each year of the study 
period.  
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Figure 1: Number of acquisitions and average premium  
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Half of the acquisitions in our sample occurred between 1996 and 2001. This period is marked by 
a concentration of transactions because it captures the wave of acquisitions that ended in 1999. 
This wave was caused in particular by increased consolidation of industries powered by 
globalization and a favorable economic environment. The periods of 1990 to 1995 and 2002 to 
2007 were calmest regarding takeovers, with 16.18% and 33.53% respectively of the acquisitions 
in our sample. The largest number of transactions—129—occurred in 1999; this coincides with 
the peak of the wave of acquisitions identified in the literature. The year 1992 was the calmest, 
with a total of 14 takeovers.  
 
5.3. Statistical description of the premium 
 
The dependent variable of our model, namely the premium paid by the buyer, varies 
considerably. The average premium is 34.62%, and the standard deviation is 30.46%. The 
maximum premium paid by a buyer is 223.65%, whereas the lowest premium is –160.94%, 
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which signifies that in some cases the buyers paid a price below the share value to acquire the 
target.4  
 
Figure 1 shows that the average premium paid by buyers varies over time. The average premium 
peaked in 1994 and 1999, at 43%. The large number of acquisitions that characterize the peak of 
the wave reached in 1999 thus coincided with substantial premiums. Since 2004, the average 
premium has been lower than that observed in previous years. 
 
5.4. Statistical description of the explanatory variables 
 
Table 2 contains a statistical description of all of the explanatory variables of the model. Several 
variables have large standard deviations. We consequently include the median to ensure that the 
interpretations based on the mean are not biased. Our first finding is that the rumors preceding the 
announcement of an offer create an average runup of 8.4%, which indicates a strong positive 
reaction by the market. This cumulative abnormal return on the target’s stock is nonetheless 
lower than that identified by Schwert (1996) for the period of 1975 to 1991, which was 13.3%. 
The runup varies considerably in our sample, and although it is generally positive, the minimum 
runup is -241%. The sensitivity analysis proves, however, that the result related to the runup is 
not influenced by this extreme value. Further, the market value of the target is on average almost 
four times higher than the book value. This mean market-to-book ratio probably does not reflect 
the reality of our sample owing to the presence of high extreme values. By comparison, the 
median market-to-book ratio is 2.13. The growth in median sales of the target is about 10%, 
which signals good financial health.  
 
The typical buyer is in good financial health, with considerable free cash flows and solid stock 
return performance. The average performance of the buyer’s stock in the six months preceding 
the runup period is 16%. Further, buyers and targets have a similar median market-to-book ratio, 
1.83 vs. 2.13. The leverage of the targets and buyers is similar because debt represents 18% to 
19% of their assets respectively. Given the similar debt structure of the parties to the transaction, 
                                                 
4 Given the significant variations in the premium, we perform a sensitivity test on the extreme values and present the 
results in Section 7. We also perform a sensitivity test on the extreme values for each of the independent variables 
related to the characteristics of the target and of the buyer. 
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it is improbable that the financial synergies identified by Slusky and Caves (1991) dictate the 
choice of the target and the price paid. The largest differences are seen in company size: on 
average, the targets are about one quarter of the size of the buyers. The transactions included in 
our sample are often friendly and are negotiated with the managers of the target. Hostile offers 
represent barely 2% of acquisitions, and public purchase offers occur in 20% of the cases. 
Further, a potential buyer is rarely faced with competing offers because the presence of several 
buyers has been identified in only 5% of cases. Transactions paid entirely in cash represent 32% 
of takeovers. 
 
Four percent of the buyers in our sample held a block of the target’s stock before the 
announcement of the offer. This result differs from Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009), who 
conclude that between 1973 and 2002, 13% of the buyers held shares of the target before the 
announcement. The difference in the percentages is explained mainly by two factors aside from 
the fact that the variable used by Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) includes all the shares held 
before the announcement, rather than only blocks of shares. They examine data beginning twelve 
years earlier than that of our sample, and demonstrate that buyers held substantially more shares 
of the target before the announcement during this period. In addition, their sample comprises 
public and private buyers, whereas our sample consists uniquely of public buyers.  Private buyers 
hold more of the target’s shares before the announcement than do public buyers, which may also 
explain the difference. 22% of the blockholders come from the same state, which is similar to the 
20% result of Kang and Kim (2008). 17% are from a regulated industry. 
 
To ensure that there is no perfect linear relation between the independent variables in (6), we 
estimated the matrix of correlation coefficients. Results are presented in Appendix A. Our 
variables do not present a collinearity problem. The highest significant correlation, 39%, is 
observed between the leverage of the target and the leverage of the buyer. Indebted buyers are 
therefore more inclined to bid on targets that possess considerable leverage, which hampers 
financial synergies posited by Slusky and Caves (1991). The second highest positive correlation 
is between the purchase offer and cash payment, 36.7%. Potential buyers therefore seem to 
believe that the optimal strategy consists in pairing the public purchase offer with cash payment. 
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Table 2: Statistical description of the independent variables 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables, namely the mean, 
standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum. These statistics were calculated based on 
our sample of 1026 takeover transactions between 1996 and 2007. 
Independent variable Mean Standard deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
1) Target 
Runup 0.084 0.285 0.067 -2.409 1.677 
Market-to-book 3.826 19.758 2.125 -95.472 536.733 
Sales growth 0.238 1.029 0.103 -0.891 23.781 
Size 5.385 1.756 5.244 0.105 11.696 
Leverage 0.178 0.214 0.104 0.000 1.722 
2) Buyer 
Return on stock 0.160 0.564 0.099 -0.807 13.948 
Free cash flows 0.072 0.106 0.082 -0.824 0.358 
Market-to-book 2.430 2.011 1.834 0.354 29.699 
Relative size 0.254 0.377 0.117 0.000 4.046 
Leverage 0.187 0.174 0.153 0.000 1.040 
3) Transaction 
Public purchase offer 0.196 0.397 0 0 1 
Cash Payment 0.316 0.465 0 0 1 
Hostility 0.019 0.138 0 0 1 
Multiple players 0.052 0.221 0 0 1 
4) Information asymmetry 
Blockholders 0.040 0.196 0 0 1 
5) Instruments 
Intrastate  0.22 0.42 0 0 1 
Intrastate* performance 0.013 0.109 0 -1.473 0.616 
Regulated industry 0.17 0.375 0 0 1 
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6. Results 
 
This section presents the univariate results, namely the profile of informed transactions. We then 
test the presence of asymmetric information and the empirical validity of several other 
determinants of the premium using the ordinary least squares, 2SLS, 3SLS, and FML methods. 
We also confirm our main result, related to information asymmetry, using the tests by Dionne, 
Gouriéroux, and Vanasse (2001) and Chiappori and Salanié (2000). 
 
6.1. Univariate results: Profile of informed transactions  
 
Table 3 presents the means and medians of the variables studied according to the information of 
the buyer. We distinguish informed and uninformed transactions. A transaction is informed when 
the buyer holds a block of shares of the target before the announcement. The statistics elucidate 
differences between transaction types. We confirm these differences by performing the Mann-
Whitney U test of the equality of medians.5 The null hypothesis of this test stipulates that the data 
of informed transactions and those of uninformed transactions originate from independent 
samples with equal medians. 
 
Te premium paid by an uninformed buyer is about twice as high as that paid by an informed 
buyer. This statistical result supports the idea that information asymmetry between buyers 
influences the premium paid considerably. The difference between the premiums is significant at 
1%. At first glance, the additional information possessed by a buyer that holds a block of shares 
seems to be advantageous because it lowers the premium. Further, the fact that the informed 
buyer pays a lower premium implies that potential buyers do not consider the private value of the 
target important. 
 
Further, the median runup is markedly lower for informed transactions (-1.7%) than for 
uninformed transactions (7.2%), which signifies that investors respond less favorably to rumors 
of an acquisition by an informed buyer. The null hypothesis of equality of medians is rejected at 
5%. The statistical results elucidate some characteristics of buyers that hold a block of shares of 
the target before the announcement. Not only are their free cash flows significantly lower than 
                                                 
5 We performed the Jarque-Bera test distinctly on each of the variables. The results indicate that none of the variables 
is normally distributed. We consequently opted for a non-parametric test. 
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those of uninformed buyers, but their median market-to-book ratio is statistically lower. The 
market therefore overvalues the assets of informed buyers less strongly. Further, on average 
buyers bid on larger targets when they hold a block of shares. But the difference is not 
statistically different according to the equality of medians. 
 
Table 3: Profile of informed and uninformed transactions 
This table presents the mean and median of the independent variables of our model for transactions in 
which the buyer holds at least 5% of the shares of the target before the announcement (informed), and for 
transactions in which the buyer does not have this percentage of the shares before the announcement 
(uninformed). The results of the Mann-Whitney U test of equality of medians are also presented. ***,**, * 
indicate that the null hypothesis of equality of medians is rejected at the level of confidence of 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
 Mean Median  
 Informed 
transactions
Uninformed 
transactions 
Informed 
transactions
Uninformed 
transactions 
Equality of 
medians 
Premium 0.182 0.353 0.163 0.340 no*** 
Independent variable 
1) Target 
Runup 0.002 0.087 -0.017 0.072 no** 
Market-to-book 3.875 3.824 1.995 2.129 yes 
Sales growth 0.207 0.240 0.085 0.104 yes 
Size 5.576 5.377 5.700 5.238 yes 
Leverage 0.218 0.176 0.134 0.101 yes 
2) Buyer 
Return on stock 0.141 0.161 0.085 0.099 yes 
Free cash flows 0.063 0.072 0.066 0.083 no* 
Market-to-book 1.941 2.450 1.519 1.846 no* 
Relative size 0.313 0.251 0.117 0.118 yes 
Leverage 0.222 0.185 0.169 0.152 yes 
3) Transaction 
Public purchase offer 0.341 0.190 0 0  
Cash Payment 0.341 0.315 0 0  
Hostility 0.073 0.017 0 0  
Multiple players 0.049 0.052 0 0  
Number of observations 41 985    
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We observe that informed buyers opt more often for a public purchase offer than do uninformed 
buyers. This type of approach, however, is not universal among informed buyers: it is used on 
average in 34% of the cases. Manifestations of hostility are also more frequent when the 
transactions are informed, but are nonetheless atypical (7.3%). Of the 41 blockholders who won 
the bid, 33% were from the same state as the target, while the corresponding percentage for all 
winners is 22.5%. The mean of the premium for blockholders in the same state that won the bid is 
16.2% while the average premium is 34.62%. 
 
6.2. Regression analysis 
 
The results of the regressions, presented in Table 4, are consistent with the theories found in 
literature on mergers and acquisitions. Our results support the markup pricing hypothesis 
formulated by Schwert (1996), whereby potential buyers adjust their offer to movements in the 
share price of the target triggered by rumors of a transaction. In our model, the premium is higher 
when the cumulative abnormal return of the target in the two months preceding the 
announcement increases. This relation is significant at 1% in all models. The target is therefore 
revalued considerably when there is a runup in the share price.  
 
Our results are also consistent with the findings of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). Targets 
that perform poorly command a higher premium because buyers can replace the managers and 
thus increase the firm value. For the transactions in our sample, a decrease in the growth of the 
sales of the target in the year preceding the announcement triggers a premium increase with a 
level of confidence of 10% (or more). Thus, fragile financial health, which can be associated with 
slowed growth in sales, does not seem to impede the negotiating power of the targets. Rather, 
buyers are more interested in the potential of a target with weaker performance.  
 
The absolute size of the target also negatively influences the premium, which supports the idea 
that buyers fear the higher integration costs associated with larger targets. This relation is 
significant at 10%. Similarly, the size of the target relative to the buyer (Relative size) is also 
negatively related to the premium, at 5% (or more). The two results pertaining to the size variable 
are consistent with our hypotheses, and validate the theory of integration costs.  
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In addition, we observe that the debt level of the target, which directly influences the free cash 
flows available to the buyer, weakens the buyer’s negotiating power. A highly indebted target 
draws a lower premium from the buyer because of its more fragile financial health. This result, 
however is not significant as the next two (Buyer Leverage and Buyer Free cash flows). Buyers 
that possess considerable leverage are not constrained to pay a lower premium because of more 
intense surveillance by creditors. On the contrary, highly indebted buyers can pay a higher 
premium. Thus, buyers with considerable leverage seem to benefit from a greater possibility of 
contracting debt, and may use this advantage to pay a higher premium. We also observe that an 
increase in the buyer’s free cash flows is associated with a higher premium. 
 
Our results are consistent with several hypotheses pertaining to the attributes of the transaction. 
First, buyers that opt for a public purchase offer pay a higher premium than buyers that negotiate 
with managers of the target. Advantages linked to the speed of execution of a transaction in the 
form of a public purchase offer are therefore attenuated by the higher premium that buyers must 
pay. This positive relation between the premium and choice of a public purchase offer, significant 
at 5% (or more), is in line with the results obtained by Comment and Schwert (1995), Schwert 
(2000) and Bange and Mazzeo (2004).  
 
Contrary to our predictions, we observe that transactions paid entirely in cash command a lower 
premium. The premium paid during cash-based transactions is lower than the premium on share-
based transactions. However, this relation is not significant at the usual confidence levels. The tax 
disadvantages for shareholders of the target associated with the cash payment therefore do not 
play a significant role in determining the premium. Our results indicate that the shareholders of 
the target try to avoid uncertainty about the future value of the shares associated with share-based 
bids. 
 
Like Schwert (2000), we note that hostile transactions are associated with a higher premium. 
Hostile offers trigger a higher premium than do friendly offers. This relation is significant at a 
confidence level of 5% (or more) and has a similar degree of influence to that determined by 
Schwert (2000), who used the definition by SDC Platinum. 
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The results clearly support our hypothesis that information asymmetry between potential buyers 
significantly influences the premium paid during an acquisition. The relation identified between 
the Blockholders variable and the premium is significant at a confidence level of 5% when 
instrumented (and 1% when not instrumented). This result is consistent with the theoretical and 
empirical studies (see Hendricks and Porter, 1988; Hong and Shum, 2003; Dionne, St-Amour, 
Vencatachellum, 2008) that find that information asymmetry between the participants influences 
the equilibrium price of an auction. 
 
In addition, the coefficient of the Blockholders variable is negative. The premium paid by an 
informed buyer is lower than that paid by buyers that do not hold privileged information. This 
difference is explained by the fact that participants that do not hold additional information are 
afraid of suffering from the winner’s curse, and thus withdraw early from the auction, which 
allows informed buyers to pay a lower premium. The literature review brought to light theoretical 
and empirical research that demonstrated that the winner’s curse prevails when potential buyers 
do not consider the private value when determining the premium. Thus, our negative coefficient 
shows that in the auction process leading to an acquisition, the target is appraised based on its 
common value. Elements such as portfolio synergies or cultural similarities do not seem to be 
relevant. 
 
The coefficient values of the OLS regressions are quite low when compared with the difference 
in the premiums observed in Table 3 (52% lower for blockholders). Those of the 2SLS are more 
representative of the observed differences, even when we apply different robustness tests (Table 
6 and Appendix C) indicating that blockholders pay a conditional premium around 70% lower 
than other bidders. 
 
We also observe that the three instruments are statistically significant in the instrumental equation 
to explain the presence of blockholders. Further, the p-value of the Sargan test indicates that these 
instruments are truly exogenous. We thus reject the null hypothesis that the over-identifying 
assumptions are valid. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Prob > F) confirms the relevance of the 
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instruments for our analysis. In other words, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid. 
 
Lastly, our model identifies premium determinants more efficiently than other empirical models 
in the literature do. Our model has an adjusted R2 of 0.27 for the OLS regression, compared with 
values of around 0.20 for the models tested by Slusky and Caves (1991), Comment and Schwert 
(1995), Gondhalekar, Sant and Ferris (2004) and Moeller (2005). 
 
6.3. Model by Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) 
 
Table 4 also presents the results of the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (DGV, 2001) test. After 
having included the estimated probability that a buyer is informed in our initial model 
  E Blockholders , we confirm a negative and significant influence of the Blockholders 
information asymmetry variable at 1%. 
 
6.4. Chiappori and Salanié (2000) test 
 
The results of the Chiappori and Salanié (2000) test (not presented in detail) validate the negative 
and significant coefficient associated with the Blockholders variable in DGV. The residuals of 
the regression of the premium on the independent variables, excluding Blockholders, along with 
those of the regression intended to determine the probability that a participant is informed, are 
negatively correlated at a level of confidence of 1%. The correlation observed is -0.11. This 
correlation confirms our hypothesis that information asymmetry between potential buyers 
influences the premium significantly. In addition, we validate that the relation is negative and 
consequently that the targets are evaluated based on common value. 
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Table 4: Results - Determinants of the premium 
This table presents the results of the regression of ordinary least squares, 2SLS, 3SLS, FIML and the DGV (2001) model. The total number of 
observations is 1026. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The statistic for the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test is Prob > F and that for the Sargan test is p-value. 
 OLS 
Premium 
DGV 
Premium 
2SLS 
Premium        Blockholders 
3SLS 
Premium       Blockholders 
FIML 
Premium       Blockholders 
1)  Information asymmetry 
Blockholders -0.136*** -0.137*** -0.704**  -0.704**  -0.732**  
Intrastate*performance    -0.153**  -0.165***  -0.164*** 
Regulated Industry    0.056***  0.059***  0.058*** 
Intrastate     0.052***  0.048***  0.047*** 
E(Blockholders)  0.409       
2)  Target 
Runup 0.510*** 0.527*** 0.487*** -0.048** 0.487*** -0.048** 0.486*** -0.048** 
Market-to-book 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales growth -0.016** -0.016** -0.016* 0.001 -0.016* 0.000 -0.016* 0.000 
Size -0.011** -0.010* -0.011* -0.003 -0.011** -0.003 -0.011** -0.003 
Leverage -0.028 -0.036 -0.016 0.017 -0.016 0.017 -0.015 0.017 
3)  Buyer 
Return on stock -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 
Free cash flows 0.095 0.099 0.089 0.053 0.089 0.057 0.088 0.056 
Market-to-book 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
Relative size -0.066*** -0.071*** -0.060** 0.014 -0.060** 0.015 -0.059** 0.015 
Leverage 0.044 0.032 0.060 0.031 0.060 0.030 0.061 0.030 
4)  Transaction 
Public purchase offer 0.049** 0.034** 0.070*** 0.046*** 0.070*** 0.046*** 0.071*** 0.046*** 
Cash payment -0.030 -0.028 -0.032 -0.001 -0.032 -0.001 -0.032 -0.001 
Hostility 0.151** 0.110** 0.209*** 0.108** 0.209*** 0.108** 0.212*** 0.108** 
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 OLS 
Premium 
DGV 
Premium 
2SLS 
Premium        Blockholders 
3SLS 
Premium       Blockholders 
FIML 
Premium       Blockholders 
Multiple player -0.009 0.000 -0.022 -0.019 -0.022 -0.018 -0.023 -0.018 
Constant 0.372*** 0.355*** 0.394*** 0.017 0.394*** 0.018 0.396*** 0.018 
R2 0.2730 0.2725 0.6305 0.0812     
Sargan test    0.5477     
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test   0.03148      
Number of observations 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 
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Table 5: Robustness tests – Dependent variable and Logit 
This table presents the results of the robustness test done with a 60-day premium, namely the price offered/price-60). The sample comprises 1024 
takeover acquisitions in each case. The table also illustrates the sensitivity of the results to extreme values of the premium by eliminating values 
situated beyond the 1st and 99th percentiles. The sample is reduced to 1,005 observations. Finally, the table presents the results for the estimation of 
the Blockholders equation using the Logit model with 1,026 observations. ***,**, * indicate that the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. The statistic for the Durbin-Hu-Hausman test is Prob > F and that for the Sargan test is p-value. 
 2SLS 
Premium 60    Blockholders
2SLS Extreme values 
Premium         Blockholders 
OLS 
Premium 60 Extreme values
2SLS Logit 
Premium     Blockholders 
1)  Information asymmetry 
Blockholders -0.930***  -0.701***  -0.155*** -0.125*** -0.605***  
Intrastate*performance  -0.154***  -0.163***    -2.333** 
Regulated Industry  0.057***  0.057***    1.243*** 
Intrastate  0.052***  0.054***    1.129*** 
2)  Target 
Runup 0.450*** -0.047** 0.388*** -0.051** 0.482*** 0.414*** 0.491*** -1.381** 
Market-to-book 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Sales growth -0.009 0.001 -0.009 0.001 -0.009 -0.009 -0.016** 0.020 
Size -0.008 -0.002 -0.014*** -0.002 -0.007 -0.013** -0.011** -0.034 
Leverage -0.022 0.018 -0.002 0.021 -0.039 -0.015 -0.018 0.527 
3)  Buyer 
Return on stock -0.019 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.019 -0.003 0.000 0.047 
Free cash flows 0.124 0.055 0.083 0.057 0.132 0.078 0.090 1.579 
Market-to-book -0.010* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 -0.001 -0.152 
Relative size -0.058* 0.015 -0.056** 0.015 -0.068** -0.063*** -0.061*** 0.207 
Leverage 0.074 0.031 0.049 0.026 0.052 0.037 0.057 0.890 
4)  Transaction 
Public purchase offer 0.066** 0.046*** 0.069*** 0.049*** 0.038 0.048*** 0.066*** 1.189*** 
Cash payment -0.025 -0.001 -0.033 -0.003 -0.022 -0.030* -0.031 0.008 
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Hostility 0.200** 0.108 0.208*** 0.106** 0.122* 0.150*** 0.199*** 1.393* 
Multiple player -0.041 -0.019 -0.025 -0.019 -0.023 -0.010 -0.020 -0.281 
Constant 0.406*** 0.016 0.424*** 0.013 0.375*** 0.397*** 0.390*** -4.076*** 
R2 0.5426 0.0816 0.6838 0.0840 0.208 0.254 0.2708 0.1527 
Sargan test  0.1791  0.4543    0.4584 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.00839  0.00684    0.0058  
Number of observations 1,024 1,024 1,005 1,005 1,024 1,005 1,026 1,026 
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7. Robustness tests  
 
The variables of our initial model were constructed based on the most pertinent calculation 
methods found in the finance literature. Other variables could have been used to test the 
hypotheses. In this section, we perform robustness tests on the dependent variable and the 
independent variables to validate our results. We also perform sensitivity tests on the extreme 
values of the dependent variable and the independent variables. All robustness regressions are 
performed with the OLS and the 2SLS models. The results are then compared with the 
corresponding model in Table 4. Finally, we test for the functional form of the structural equation 
by estimating the logit model. 
 
7.1. Dependent variable and Logit model 
7.1.1. Definition of the dependent variable  
 
Initially, we define the premium as a logarithm of the ratio of the price offered to the share price 
of the target 42 business days before the announcement of the offer. Similar empirical studies 
employ different temporal points of comparison for the premium paid. We validate our results by 
comparing the price offered with the share price of the target 60 days before the announcement, 
as did Betton and Eckbo (2000). The Premium 60 columns in Table 5 show the results. Our 
model remains robust when the 60-day premium is used. With a few exceptions, the coefficients 
keep their signs, order of magnitude and level of confidence. 
 
7.1.2. Testing sensitivity to extreme values of the premium 
 
Given that the descriptive statistics demonstrated a considerable standard deviation of the 
premium, we validate that our results are not attributable to the presence of extreme values in the 
dependent variable. We tested the sensitivity of the model to extreme values by eliminating the 
acquisitions for which the premium value is situated beyond the 1st and 99th percentiles. The 
results shown in Table 5 (Extreme values) are in line with those of the initial model. Almost all 
variables keep their sign and magnitude. 
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7.1.3. Logit model for instrumental equation 
 
We also tested the functional form of the structural equation by estimating a logit equation for 
Blockholders instead of ordinary least squares. The results in Table 5 indicate that the functional 
form of first-stage regression does not affect the consistency of the second-stage estimates as well 
the significance of the different tests, when compared to those of 2SLS in Table 4. 
 
7.2. Independent variables 
7.2.1. Definition of the independent variables 
 
We also validate that the results are not attributable to the method used to construct the 
independent variables. Tables 6 and 7 show the results of these robustness tests. 
 
Sales growth 
 
We use the Return on equity of the target, defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary 
items to the book value of the equity, to reflect the past performance of managers of the target 
rather than sales growth. This variable supports the hypothesis that the acquisition of poorly 
managed targets is motivated by realizable gains if the current managers are replaced (Cudd and 
Duggal, 2000). The coefficient of return on equity is not significant in Table 6 (2SLS) but is 
significant in Table 7 (OLS). 
 
Financial synergies 
 
We confirm the results associated with leverage of the parties to the transaction by replacing 
long-term debt with Total liabilities. For the indebtedness of the target (T leverage), the 
influence on the premium remains negative and non-significant. Regarding the buyer’s leverage 
(B leverage), the use of Total liabilities doubles the positive coefficient and makes it significant 
at 5%  
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Company size 
 
We confirm that a small target draws a higher premium because of lower integration costs. We 
obtain a negative and significant coefficient for the size of the target (Size market value), which 
is defined as the logarithm of the market value of common shares outstanding. This alternative 
size variant creates a slightly lower coefficient, significant at 1% rather than 5%. Further, the 
robustness test done on the relative size variable (Relative size II) corroborates our initial results. 
By comparing total assets of the target with those of the buyer, we estimate a negative 
coefficient. However, it is no longer significant. 
 
Hostility 
 
The robustness tests done on the hostility variable are satisfactory. First, we created an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 when the offer is unsolicited (Unsolicited offer), i.e. when the 
offer comes as a surprise to the Board of Directors of the target and no recommendation is 
formulated. We confirm the positive and significant impact of this form of hostility on the 
premium (Hostility I). Nonetheless, the coefficient is reduced by half and becomes significant at 
5% rather than 1%. Further, the use of a “Poison pill” by the target, a defense method often 
associated with hostility, has a positive and significant influence on the premium (Hostility II). 
 
Again, the coefficient of Blockholders remains negative and significant when we apply different 
definitions for the independent variables. 
 
7.2.2. Extreme values of the independent variables 
 
Appendix B shows the results obtained for the OLS model when extreme values beyond the 1st 
and 99th percentiles were eliminated. Results for the 2SLS are presented in Appendix C. Most of 
our results are robust to the sensitivity test of the extreme values on the independent variables 
related to the characteristics of the target. The elimination of extreme values of the runup, size of 
the target and leverage influences the results very little. The effect of the sensitivity test is more 
evident in the market-to-book ratio of the target, which becomes negative and significant (not for 
2SLS). This result implies that buyers pay more for undervalued targets. The greatest influence of 
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the sensitivity test is seen in the target’s sales growth. The coefficient is no longer significant, 
whereas two variables become significant--free cash flows of the buyer and the variable 
indicating a cash-based transaction (not for 2SLS). Thus the extreme values notably influence the 
results related to sales growth and the market-to-book ratio of the target. 
 
Further, we observe that our results are also robust to the sensitivity test of extreme values done 
on the independent variables related to the characteristics of the buyer. Apart from the 
coefficients of return on stock and leverage of the buyer, which change signs but remain non-
significant, the results related to the characteristics of the buyer are not influenced by extreme 
values. In all cases, the coefficient of the Blockholders variable is not significantly affected. 
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Table 6: 2SLS Robustness tests – Independent variables 
We perform robustness tests on several independent variables with the 2SLS method. Regarding the characteristics of the target, we test for sales 
growth, size and leverage. We also test the robustness of the relative size, leverage of the buyer, and hostility of the transaction (Unsolicited offer 
and Poison pill). Results of the structural equation are not presented but are available. The statistic for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is Prob > F 
and that for the Sargan test is p-value. 
 
2SLS 
(Sales growth)
2SLS 
(T leverage) 
2SLS 
(B leverage) 
2SLS 
(T size) 
2SLS 
(Hostility I) 
2SLS 
(Hostility II)
2SLS 
(Relative size)
1)  Information asymmetry 
Blockholders -0.641* -0.663** -0.716** -0.730** -0.697** -0.766** -0.685** 
2)  Target 
Runup 0.487*** 0.492*** 0.483*** 0.477*** 0.487*** 0.487*** 0.494*** 
Market-to-book 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales growth  -0.016* -0.016* -0.015* -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* 
Return on equity -0.001       
Size -0.011** -0.010* -0.015**  -0.012** -0.010* -0.013** 
Size market value    -0.018***    
Leverage -0.022  -0.015 -0.022 -0.016 -0.010 -0.010 
Total liabilities  -0.032      
3)  Buyer 
Recent performance 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
Free cash flows 0.085 0.085 0.104 0.112 0.087 0.086 0.100 
Market-to-book -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Relative size -0.061** -0.062** -0.052** -0.049** -0.061** -0.061**  
Relative size II       -0.004 
Leverage 0.057 0.058  0.066 0.056 0.055 0.037 
Total liabilities   0.100**     
4)  Transaction 
Public purchase offer 0.067** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.069** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 
Cash payment -0.031 -0.034 -0.033 -0.033 -0.034 -0.035 -0.026 
Hostility 0.204*** 0.205*** 0.211*** 0.223***   0.212*** 
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2SLS 
(Sales growth)
2SLS 
(T leverage) 
2SLS 
(B leverage) 
2SLS 
(T size) 
2SLS 
(Hostility I) 
2SLS 
(Hostility II)
2SLS 
(Relative size)
Unsolicited offer     0.157**   
Poison pill      0.264**  
Multiple player -0.019 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.052 -0.002 -0.028 
Constant 0.391*** 0.403*** 0.365*** 0.422*** 0.398*** 0.394*** 0.390*** 
R2 0.6412 0.6387 0.6294 0.6280 0.6313 0.6163 0.6323 
Sargan test 0.5263 0.5914 0.4030 0.5287 0.5707 0.6464 0.7468 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.09031 0.05154 0.02933 0.02493 0.03128 0.02050 0.04020 
Number of observations 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 
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Table 7: OLS Robustness tests – Independent variables 
We perform robustness tests on several independent variables with the OLS method. Regarding the characteristics of the target, we test for sales 
growth, size and leverage. We also test the robustness of the relative size, leverage of the buyer, and hostility of the transaction (Unsolicited offer 
and Poison pill). The statistic for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is Prob > F and that for the Sargan test is p-value. 
 
OLS 
(Sales growth)
OLS 
(T leverage) 
OLS 
(B leverage) 
OLS 
(T size) 
OLS 
(Hostility I) 
OLS 
(Hostility II)
OLS 
(Relative size)
1)  Information asymmetry 
Blockholders -0.125*** -0.134*** -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.135*** -0.139*** 
2)  Target 
Runup 0.506*** 0.514*** 0.507*** 0.502*** 0.510*** 0.512*** 0.517*** 
Market-to-book 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales growth  -0.016** -0.016** -0.015** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** 
Return on equity -0.006**       
Size -0.010** -0.009* -0.013***  -0.010** -0.010* -0.013*** 
Size market value    -0.017***    
Leverage -0.030  -0.029 -0.034 -0.028 -0.025 -0.021 
Total liabilities  -0.051      
3)  Buyer 
Recent performance 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
Free cash flows 0.089 0.088 0.108 0.118 0.094 0.094 0.110 
Market-to-book 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Relative size -0.068*** -0.070*** -0.061*** -0.056** -0.068*** -0.068***  
Relative size II       -0.004 
Leverage 0.042 0.042  0.049 0.042 0.039 0.020 
Total liabilities   0.081**     
4)  Transaction 
Public purchase offer 0.048** 0.051** 0.048** 0.047** 0.054** 0.051** 0.051** 
Cash payment -0.030 -0.033* -0.031 -0.031 -0.032 -0.032 -0.023 
Hostility 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.163***   0.157*** 
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OLS 
(Sales growth)
OLS 
(T leverage) 
OLS 
(B leverage) 
OLS 
(T size) 
OLS 
(Hostility I) 
OLS 
(Hostility II)
OLS 
(Relative size)
Unsolicited offer     0.086*   
Poison pill      0.165*  
Multiple player -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.021 0.006 -0.016 
Constant -0.125*** -0.134*** 0.347*** -0.137*** 0.372*** 0.369*** 0.367*** 
R2 0.273 0.274 0.275 0.279 0.271 0.271 0.267 
Number of observations 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 
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8. Conclusion 
 
We modeled the corporate acquisition process as an English ascending auction owing to the 
presence of potential buyers. Our main objective was to analyze whether information asymmetry 
between potential buyers has a significant impact on the premium paid during acquisitions. Our 
second objective was to validate several determinants of the premium paid, which were identified 
in the empirical literature. This objective follows from the rare consensus in the research on the 
significance of the determinants related to the characteristics of the target, the buyer and the 
transaction.  
 
In addition, our study enriches the literature by offering a new sample, which comprises 1026 
takeover transactions in the United States between 1990 and 2007. Notably, our sample is very 
recent and encompasses data from several sources, which allows us to simultaneously test 
determinants related to the target, the buyer and the transaction process. Further, the sample 
precisely captures the wave of acquisitions that peaked in 1999, which indicates that it is 
representative of the takeover market during the period studied.  
 
Our empirical analysis yields interesting conclusions related to the corporate acquisition process. 
First, we observed that information asymmetry between participants influences the premium paid 
during a takeover significantly. Informed buyers, that are buyers that hold at least 5% of the 
shares of the target before the announcement of the offer, pay a significantly lower conditional 
premium (around 70% lower) than do buyers that do not possess privileged information. Further, 
the analysis of this negative coefficient provides deep insight into the way the target is valued. 
Informed buyers pay a lower premium because the participants that do not hold private 
information are afraid of suffering the winner’s curse (winning by bidding too high) and either 
withdraw from the auction early or do not participate. The winner’s curse prevails among 
uninformed buyers when participants do not factor private value into their valuation of the target. 
Our negative coefficient thus shows that in the auction process leading to an acquisition, the 
participants consider the target’s common value exclusively. They do not use personal criteria 
such as portfolio synergies or cultural similarities in their valuation 
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The negative and significant influence of information asymmetry on the premium paid is 
confirmed using several models and robustness tests on the specification of the dependent and 
independent variables and on the extreme values of all variables of interest. 
 
Our empirical analysis also enabled as to affirm several determinants of the premium identified in 
the literature. Notably, our result supports the idea that the runup in the share price of the target, 
triggered by rumors preceding the announcement of the offer, leads buyers to re-value the target. 
Buyers are not certain that they possess the information that drives this movement in the stock 
and therefore prefer to adjust their offer accordingly. We also observed that buyers pay more for 
targets with weaker performance because of the large potential gains associated with targets in 
difficulty. Further, our results support the theory of integration costs, which stipulates that buyers 
prefer smaller targets because of their lower absorption costs. The size of the target and relative 
size to the buyer are therefore negatively related to the premium paid. Lastly, a buyer that opts for 
a public purchase offer or a hostile takeover generally pays more to acquire the target. Our study 
therefore better equips the parties involved in the takeover process to set the preliminary price of 
the transaction and thus enhance their growth strategies. 
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Appendix A: Matrix of correlation coefficients of independent variables 
This table presents the correlation coefficient between the independent variables of our model. 
*indicates a level of significance greater than or equal to 5% 
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Characteristics of 
the target                
Runup 1.000               
Market-to-book -0.010 1.000              
Sales growth 0.046 0.042 1.000             
Size -0.140* 0.032 -0.040 1.000            
Leverage 0.022 0.122* 0.057 0.257* 1.000           
Characteristics of 
the buyer                
Return on stock 0.018 0.017 0.015 -0.033 -0.031 1.000          
Free cash flows 0.068* 0.015 0.025 0.006 -0.081* -0.061* 1.000         
Market-to-book 0.030 0.072* 0.123* -0.173* -0.1420* 0.118* 0.072* 1.000        
Relative size -0.105* -0.019 -0.011 0.253* 0.112* 0.052 -0.148* -0.139* 1.000       
Leverage 0.003 -0.028 0.006 0.1529* 0.3900* 0.002 -0.099* -0.214* 0.220* 1.000      
Transaction                
Public purchase offer 0.040 -0.031 0.012 -0.063* -0.037 -0.056 0.054 -0.037 -0.097* -0.061* 1.000     
Cash payment -0.026 -0.020 -0.031 -0.165* -0.205* -0.076* 0.124* -0.060* -0.192* -0.122* 0.367* 1.000    
Hostility -0.019 -0.009 -0.018 0.128* 0.033 -0.022 0.008 -0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.161* -0.005 1.000   
Multiple players -0.014 -0.020 -0.025 0.113* 0.018 -0.040 0.007 -0.037 0.086* -0.006 0.096* -0.016 0.190* 1.000  
Information 
asymmetry                
Blockholders 
(not instrumented) -0.058 0.000 -0.006 -0.006 0.038 -0.007 -0.017 -0.050 0.032 -0.042 0.075* 0.011 0.079 -0.003 1.000 
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Appendix B: OLS Sensitivity test of the extreme values of the independent 
variables 
This table presents the results of the initial OLS model and the results of this sensitivity tests on the 
extreme values of each of the independent variables related to the characteristics of the target and the 
buyer. For each of the independent variables we tested the sensitivity of the model to extreme values by 
eliminating acquisitions for which the value of the independent variable is situated beyond the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. For each regression, we present the coefficients and their p-value. ***,**, * indicate that the 
coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Tested variables are indicated at the top of 
each column. 
Independent 
variable Initial model Runup 
Market-to-
book Sales growth Size T-Leverage
1) Information asymmetry   
Blockholders -0.136*** -0.144*** -0.123*** -0.140*** -0.138*** -0.148*** 
2) Target 
Runup 0.510*** 0.453*** 0.507*** 0.495*** 0.508*** 0.517*** 
Market-to-book 0.000 0.000 -0.005* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales growth -0.016** -0.012 -0.016* -0.011 -0.016** -0.018** 
Size -0.011** -0.013*** -0.011* -0.011** -0.010* -0.012** 
Leverage -0.028 0.007 -0.032 -0.039 -0.025 0.017 
3) Buyer   
Return on stock -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 
Free cash flows 0.095 0.118 0.099 0.153* 0.091 0.100 
Market-to-book 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Relative size -0.066*** -0.074*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.066*** -0.066*** 
Leverage 0.044 0.022 0.049 0.056 0.044 0.021 
4) Transaction   
Public purchase 
offer 0.049** 0.057*** 0.046** 0.052** 0.049** 0.056** 
Cash payment -0.030 -0.030 -0.032 -0.033* -0.032 -0.033 
Hostility 0.151** 0.147** 0.152** 0.152*** 0.149** 0.149** 
Multiple players -0.009 -0.014 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.011 
Constant 0.372*** 0.387*** 0.382*** 0.373*** 0.372*** 0.377*** 
Adjusted R2 0.273 0.204 0.269 0.268 0.270 0.281 
Number of 
observations 1,026 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,015 
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Appendix B: OLS Sensitivity test of the extreme values of the independent 
variables (continued) 
Independent 
variable Initial model 
Return on 
stock 
Free cash 
flows 
Market-to-
book Relative Size B-Leverage
1) Information asymmetry   
Blockholders -0.136*** -0.139*** -0.127*** -0.134*** -0.133*** -0.132*** 
2) Target 
Runup 0.510*** 0.500*** 0.528*** 0.508*** 0.514*** 0.515*** 
Market-to-book 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales growth -0.016** -0.011 -0.014* -0.017** -0.004 -0.016** 
Size -0.011** -0.011** -0.009* -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** 
Leverage -0.028 -0.036 -0.031 -0.025 -0.031 -0.024 
3) Buyer   
Return on stock -0.001 0.008 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Free cash flows 0.095 0.039 0.031 0.083 0.096 0.088 
Market-to-book 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Relative size -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.061*** -0.069*** -0.085*** -0.060*** 
Leverage 0.044 0.035 0.042 0.058 0.041 -0.016 
4) Transaction   
Public purchase 
offer 0.049** 0.048** 0.049** 0.048** 0.047** 0.051** 
Cash payment -0.030 -0.032* -0.026 -0.028 -0.031 -0.028 
Hostility 0.151** 0.150*** 0.150** 0.150** 0.153** 0.152*** 
Multiple players -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 
Constant 0.372*** 0.383*** 0.361*** 0.352*** 0.372*** 0.376*** 
Adjusted R2 0.273 0.271 0.284 0.272 0.285 0.285 
Number of 
observations 1,026 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,005 1,015 
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Appendix C: 2SLS Sensitivity test of the extreme values of the independent 
variables 
This table presents the results of the initial 2SLS model and the results of this sensitivity tests on the 
extreme values of each of the independent variables related to the characteristics of the target and the 
buyer. For each of the independent variables we tested the sensitivity of the model to extreme values by 
eliminating acquisitions for which the value of the independent variable is situated beyond the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. For each regression, we present the coefficients and their p-value. ***,**, * indicate that the 
coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Tested variables are indicated at the top of 
each column. Results of the instrumental equation are not presented but are available. 
Independent variable Initial model Runup Market-to-book Sales growth Size T-Leverage
1) Information asymmetry   
Blockholders -0.704** -0.588** -0.575** -0.598** -0.719** -0.514** 
2) Target 
Runup 0.487*** 0.426*** 0.489*** 0.476*** 0.484*** 0.503*** 
Market-to-book 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales growth -0.016* -0.011 -0.016* -0.013 -0.016* -0.018** 
Size -0.011* -0.013*** -0.012** -0.011** -0.011* -0.012** 
Leverage -0.016 0.016 -0.028 -0.032 -0.013 0.014 
3) Buyer   
Return on stock 0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 
Free cash flows 0.089 0.111 0.089 0.150* 0.084 0.095 
Market-to-book -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 
Relative size -0.060** -0.069*** -0.057** -0.059** -0.060** -0.062*** 
Leverage 0.060 0.036 0.057 0.063 0.060 0.039 
4) Transaction   
Public purchase offer 0.070*** 0.074*** 0.064** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 
Cash payment -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.034 -0.034 -0.037 
Hostility 0.209*** 0.192*** 0.200*** 0.202*** 0.208*** 0.186*** 
Multiple players -0.022 -0.025 -0.020 -0.031 -0.022 -0.019 
Constant 0.394*** 0.406*** 0.400*** 0.393*** 0.396*** 0.390*** 
Adjusted R2 0.6305 0.6597 0.6545 0.6563 0.6256 0.6678 
Sargan test 0.5477 0.4530 0.4045 0.5900 0.5878 0.4964 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test 0.03148 0.06539 0.19058 0.06281 0.02549 0.14084 
Number of 
observations 1,026 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,015 
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Appendix C: 2SLS Sensitivity test of the extreme values of the independent 
variables (continued) 
Independent 
variable Initial model 
Return on 
stock 
Free cash 
flows 
Market-to-
book Relative Size B-Leverage
1) Information asymmetry   
Blockholders -0.704** -0.628** -0.796*** -0.754** -0.707** -0.663** 
2) Target 
Runup 0.487*** 0.480*** 0.500*** 0.481*** 0.491*** 0.494*** 
Market-to-book 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales growth -0.016* -0.011 -0.015* -0.017** -0.003 -0.016* 
Size -0.011* -0.012** -0.010* -0.011** -0.011* -0.010** 
Leverage -0.016 -0.026 -0.017 -0.012 -0.017 -0.013 
3) Buyer   
Return on stock 0.000 0.010 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Free cash flows 0.089 0.031 0.036 0.074 0.094 0.082 
Market-to-book -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 
Relative size -0.060** -0.060** -0.052* -0.070*** -0.069** -0.054** 
Leverage 0.060 0.049 0.058 0.078 0.057 -0.008 
4) Transaction   
Public purchase 
offer 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.069** 0.070*** 
Cash payment -0.032 -0.034 -0.026 -0.031 -0.032 -0.029 
Hostility 0.209*** 0.202*** 0.218*** 0.213*** 0.211*** 0.205*** 
Multiple players -0.022 -0.021 -0.025 -0.018 -0.021 -0.021 
Constant 0.394*** 0.404*** 0.393*** 0.379*** 0.395*** 0.395*** 
Adjusted R2 0.6305 0.6526 0.6158 0.6218 0.6288 0.6448 
Sargan test 0.5477 0.3486 0.3830 0.5081 0.5082 0.5001 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test 0.03148 0.04865 0.00810 0.03507 0.02960 0.03815 
Number of 
observations 1,026 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,005 1,015 
 
 
